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Patient-care items can serve as a source or reservoir for healthcare-associated pathogens in hospitals. We reviewed healthcare- 
associated outbreaks from medical equipment and provide infection prevention recommendations. Multiple healthcare-associated 
outbreaks via a contaminated patient-care item were identified, including infections with multidrug-resistant organisms. The type of 
patient care items implicated as a fomite causing healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) has changed over time. Patient populations 
at risk were most commonly critically ill patients in adult and neonatal intensive care units. Most fomite related healthcare-associated 
outbreaks were due to inappropriate disinfection practices. Repeated healthcare-associated outbreaks via medical equipment high-
light the need for infectious disease professionals to understand that fomites/medical devices may be a source of HAIs. The intro-
duction of new and more complex medical devices will likely increase the risk that such devices serve as a source of HAIs. Assuring 
appropriate cleaning and disinfection or sterilization of medical equipment is necessary to prevent future fomite-associated out-
breaks.
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A fomite is defined as an inanimate object that can be the vehi-
cle for transmission of an infectious agent [1]. In the hospital, 
fomites include patient care items and environmental surfaces 
[2–4]. It has been demonstrated that such items (eg, medical 
equipment, surfaces) are frequently contaminated and can 
serve as a reservoir or source for multidrug-resistant organ-
isms (MDROs) such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and 
Clostridium difficile [5, 6]. Transmission of MDROs from con-
taminated devices or surfaces to a patient may occur via direct 
contact, indirectly via the hands/gloves of healthcare personnel, 
or less commonly via aerosols, water, or food [7].
Our previous review in 1987 described that a variety of 
fomites present in the hospital environment were involved in 
healthcare-associated outbreaks, including carpets, mattresses, 
beds, stethoscopes, thermometers, intra-aortic balloon pumps, 
pressure transducers, enteral feeds, contaminated germicides, 
chutes, and others [8]. Almost 30 years have passed since this 
review and many additional outbreaks of fomite-associated 
infections have been published. Although there are also some 
previous reviews of environmental surfaces and medical 
equipment [5, 6, 9, 10], to our knowledge, there are no recent 
reviews focused on actual outbreaks via a specific patient care 
item. The purpose of this article was to review healthcare- 
associated outbreaks and infections via medical equipment, 
primarily by semicritical and noncritical patient care items 
commonly used in daily practice, and provide infection preven-
tion recommendations for each healthcare fomite.
LITERATURE SEARCH AND SELECTION CRITERIA
We searched the published literature (January 1987–December 
2016) via PubMed using patient care items and the following 
Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) as well as keywords: (hospi-
tals OR hospital units OR nursing homes OR ambulatory care 
facilities OR ambulatory care OR dental facilities OR assisted 
living facilities OR healthcare settings) AND (healthcare- 
acquired infection OR nosocomial OR cross infection OR out-
break). We screened articles using titles and abstracts, then 
carefully reviewed selected articles. We included articles of 
outbreaks and infections via a patient care item when authors 
reported human cases with identification of same organism in 
clinical samples from patients and environmental samples from 
medical equipment, and excluded articles describing contam-
ination only of a pathogen with each fomite, articles without 
abstracts, not written in English, and review articles. The fol-
lowing healthcare fomites were beyond the scope of this review, 
although some have been previously reviewed: environmental 
surfaces [5, 6, 10], laundry and bedding [11, 12], healthcare per-
sonnel’s attire and devices [13–15], endoscopes [16–20], water 
[21], air [22], invasive indwelling devices (eg, devices involved 
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in ventilator-associated pneumonia, central line–associated 
bloodstream infection, or catheter-associated urinary tract 
infection), and sharps (eg, devices involved in percutaneous 
injuries).
In this review, we summarized characteristics of medical 
equipment and patient care items that have served as a fomite 
for a healthcare-associated outbreak (Tables 1 and 2). Clinical 
significance for healthcare-associated outbreaks and infections 
via a fomite was categorized as low (≤3 outbreaks), moderate 
(4–6 outbreaks), and high (≥7 outbreaks), based on the number 
of published reports during the 30-year review period. We also 
provided a trend of outbreaks related to selected fomites during 
January 1987 to December 2016 (Figure 1). The number of pub-
lished articles describing outbreaks and infections relevant to a 
patient care item was counted. For selected medical equipment, 
we briefly discussed infection prevention issues. Details of clean-
ing, disinfection, and sterilization are available in the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines [2–4], other 
reviews [23, 24], and the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) websites 
(for FDA-cleared sterilants and high-level disinfectants (https://
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
ReprocessingofReusableMedicalDevices/ucm437347.htm; 
for EPA-registered disinfectants, https://www.epa.gov/pesti 
cide-registration/selected-epa-registered-disinfectants).
OVERALL TREND IN PATIENT CARE ITEMS AS 
FOMITE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS
Fomites recognized in the 1987 previous review [8] (eg, humid-
ifier, nebulizer, urine-measuring device, stethoscope, thermom-
eter, suction apparatus, pressure transducer) have continued 
to be implicated in healthcare-associated outbreaks (Table 1). 
There were also various contaminated fomites implicated with-
out having clear evidence of healthcare-associated outbreaks 
and infections (Table  2). During the 3 decades since our last 
review, additional healthcare fomites (eg, hand soap/sanitizer 
dispenser, ultrasound probe/gel, computer keyboards) have 
been identified. The type of patient care items as a fomite has 
changed over time (Figure  1), and some of them were likely 
to be reduced (eg, nebulizer, pressure transducer, thermome-
ter), but others were not. The number of healthcare-associated 
outbreaks via a patient care item may be affected by publica-
tion bias, depending on authors’ interest (eg, rare organism or 
fomite) and findings [25]. Furthermore, there likely would be 
more unpublished healthcare-associated outbreaks than pub-
lished ones, given concern about reduced reputation of health-
care facility.
MAJOR PATIENT CARE ITEMS AS 
A HEALTHCARE FOMITE
Respiratory Care Equipment (Humidifier, Nebulizer, and Suction Apparatus)
Contamination with Acinetobacter baumannii of the tempera-
ture probe of a humidifier caused a hospital outbreak of pneumo-
nia among patients in an intensive care unit (ICU), even though 
the probe was disinfected with 70% ethanol as recommended 
by the manufacturer. The outbreak was ended when low-tem-
perature plasma sterilization was utilized for decontamination 
[26]. Acinetobacter calcoaceticus sepsis outbreak in a neonatal 
ICU and an A. baumannii ventilator-associated pneumonia 
outbreak were caused by contamination of warm air humidi-
fiers [27] and the oxygen humidifying chambers [28], respec-
tively. An outbreak of Burkholderia cepacia respiratory tract 
Table 1. Pathogens Associated With a Fomite, Transmission Mechanism, and Infection Prevention Recommendations in Moderate to High Significance 
Categories of Healthcare-Associated Outbreaks




Enterobacter, Pseudomonas, Serratia Contact Moderate Use disposable dispenser, antiseptic with greater bactericidal 
activity (eg, chlorhexidine) and/or alcohol-based handrub, use 
antimicrobial at recommended concentration
Humidifier Acinetobacter, Acremonium, Burkholderia, 




High Avoid use of humidifier when possible, use sterile water, disinfect 
between use





High Avoid sharing multidose medications between patients, use sterile 
water, disinfect device between use
Pressure 
transducer
Pseudomonas, Serratia Contact Moderate Disinfect pressure transducer between patients, use disposable 
dome, adhere to aseptic technique
Stethoscope Acinetobacter, Klebsiella, Pseudomonas Contact Moderate Prudent to disinfect between patients
Suction 
apparatus
Acinetobacter, Enterobacter, Klebsiella, 




High Avoid backflow, avoid aerosolization, disinfect suction apparatus 
properly
Thermometer Clostridium, Enterobacter, Enterococcus, 
Klebsiella
Contact High Proper disinfection between uses of thermometer, use single-use 
disposable thermometer when available
Ultrasound 
probe
Burkholderia, Enterobacter, Mycobacterium, 
Pseudomonas, Salmonella, Serratia, 
Staphylococcus
Contact High Low-level disinfect for surface probes and high-level disinfect for 
endocavitary probes between patients; label gel bottles and use 
sterile gels if available
aClinical significance for outbreaks via a fomite was categorized as low (≤3 outbreaks), moderate (4–6 outbreaks), and high (≥7 outbreaks).
infection in a pediatric ICU was caused by patient-to-patient 
transmission via respiratory devices and heated humidifier 
water. Control measures could include use of disposable, ster-
ilizable, or easy-to-clean/disinfect materials [29]. A Klebsiella 
oxytoca (K1 β-lactamase overproduction) outbreak among neo-
nates in a neonatal ICU was associated with water reservoirs of 
humidifiers [30]. An outbreak of Pseudomonas cepacia respira-
tory infection in an ICU was due to contamination of reusable 
electronic temperature probes used with servo-controlled ven-
tilator humidifiers, and highlighted the need to facilitate ade-
quate disinfection practices for reusable patient care items [31]. 
A Stenotrophomonas maltophilia outbreak in a surgical ICU was 
also caused by electronic temperature probes used with ser-
vo-controlled humidifiers that were wiped with a quaternary 
ammonium compound disinfectant [32].
Legionellosis in patients with nonrespiratory diseases was 
related to use of contaminated oxygen bubble humidifiers 
filled with tap water, suggesting sterile water should be used in 
humidifiers [33]. An outbreak of Legionella pneumophila infec-
tion in neonates was also probably due to aerosol generated 
by a cold mist ultrasonic humidifier filled with contaminated 
water, indicating that use of such humidifiers should be avoided 
in a neonatal ICU [34]. The CDC guideline recommends that 
large-volume room air humidifiers producing aerosols should 
be avoided unless they are subjected to high-level disinfection 
and filled with sterile water [2].
An outbreak of Mycobacterium chelonae eye infection in 
an outpatient clinic of laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis 
(LASIK) was likely led by water reservoir of the misting humid-
ifier that was utilized to maintain the high level of humidity 
recommended by the manufacturers of lasers for LASIK. This 
underscored the importance for careful adherence to current 
guidelines even in outpatient settings [35]. A  fungal endoph-
thalmitis outbreak due to Acremonium kiliense among patients 
after cataract surgery in an outpatient setting was associated 
with a contaminated high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) fil-
ter, followed by the humidifier water contamination in the ven-
tilation system [36]. Appropriate engineering humidity control 
of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system is essen-
tial for preventing spread of airborne pathogens [2].
Multiple outbreaks of B.  cepacia respiratory infection and 
bacteremia, mostly among patients, occurred in association 
with nebulizers (eg, solution, medication, tube), and the use of 
multidose vials for multiple patients should be avoided [37–42]. 
An outbreak of P. cepacia pneumonia among immunocompro-
mised patients was associated with contamination of nebulizers 
that were utilized for prophylactic inhalations of polymyxin B 
and amphotericin B [43]. Ultrasonic nebulizers used to humid-
ify tracheostomies were involved in an MRSA outbreak in a head 
Table  2. Pathogens Associated With a Fomite in Low Significance 
Category of Healthcare-Associated Outbreaks
Fomite Pathogen
Atomizer Alcaligenes, Achromobacter
Breast pump Acinetobacter, Serratia
Computer keyboard/ 
mobile phone/tablet





Enteral feed Salmonella, Serratia
Medical chart Acinetobacter, Escherichia, Klebsiella, 
Staphylococcus, Streptococcus
Shaving razor Klebsiella, Microsporum, Serratia
Tourniquet/ 
exsanguinator
Acinetobacter, Enterococcus, Candida, 
Staphylococcus, Proteus






Wheelchairs Acinetobacter, Pseudomonas, Staphylococcus
Figure 1. Trend in patient care items as a fomite causing healthcare-associated outbreaks during a 30-year period. During January 1987–December 2016, the number of 
published articles describing outbreaks relevant to each patient care item is shown.
and neck surgical ward [44]. Contaminated tap water to rinse 
medication nebulizers resulted in an outbreak of legionellosis 
among patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; 
thus, tap water should be avoided in filling or rinsing nebulizers 
[45]. Importantly, fluid-containing respiratory equipment such 
as humidifiers and nebulizers can be heavily contaminated by 
bacteria capable of proliferating in water; these pathogens may 
be transferred to patients by healthcare personnel, aerosoliza-
tion into room air, direct airway inoculation through connected 
ventilation system, or contaminated medications [8].
Pathogens from contaminated suction collection units can be 
transmitted to patients through healthcare personnel’s hands or 
retrograde spread during their use or can be dispersed by aero-
sols [8]. Contamination of suction apparatus (eg, catheter, tube, 
rubber pipe, quiver, portable suction device) was involved in the 
following outbreaks: MDR A.  baumannii, MDR Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa, S.  maltophilia, and Serratia marcescens postopera-
tive empyema in ICU [46–49]; MDR A. baumannii, extended- 
spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)–producing Klebsiella pneumoniae, 
Enterobacter aerogenes, Salmonella worthington, and MRSA in 
neonatal or pediatric ICU [50–54]; MDR P. aeruginosa in a long-
term-care facility [55]; and A. baumannii meningitis in neuro-
surgical patients [56]. The cause of these outbreaks was mainly 
improper disinfection and reuse, as well as external contamina-
tion of suction catheters. Adherence to a disinfection practice as 
determined by the intended use of the patient care item and the 
tissue(s) the item is expected to contact; use of sterile, single-use 
catheters when the open-system suction is employed; and use of 
sterile fluid in removing secretions from the suction catheter are 
recommended [4, 24, 57].
THERMOMETER
Rectal thermometers served as a fomite for outbreaks of 
Enterobacter cloacae in neonatal ICU, VRE in an ICU, or 
C. difficile infection among older patients partially because of
improper disinfection, and replacement to single-use dispos-
able or tympanic thermometers resulted in the reduction in
VRE and C.  difficile infection [58–63]. Transmission of VRE
in a community hospital occurred via an electric ear probe
thermometer, likely due to the disposable probe sheath con-
taminated from the handle of the thermometer [64]. ESBL-
producing K. pneumoniae in a neonatal unit was caused in part
by incorrect use of a personal electric thermometer and con-
tamination of an oxygen saturation probe with a fabric-covered
transducer [65]. Thermometers should be low-level disinfected
using EPA-registered disinfectants between patient uses or be
replaced by single-use disposable thermometers [4].
ULTRASOUND PROBE
Contaminated ultrasound gels led to B. cepacia infection and 
bacteremia, S. aureus pyoderma, or Mycobacterium massiliense 
surgical site infection in neonates, children, or ICU patients [66–
69]. Contamination of transesophageal echocardiography (TEE) 
probes was involved in outbreaks of E. cloacae, S. marcescens, or 
MDR P. aeruginosa in cardiac surgical patients [70–72] and an 
outbreak of ESBL-producing Salmonella enterica serotype Isangi 
among surgical patients for transplant [73]. Legionella pneumo-
phila pneumonia cases were also associated with contaminated 
water to rinse TEE probes [74]. Although surface probes used on 
intact skin are considered as noncritical items that are subjected 
to at least low-level disinfection between patients, endocavitary 
probes such as TEE, transvaginal, or transrectal probes contact 
directly with mucous membranes and are considered semicrit-
ical items [75]. Therefore, high-level disinfection of the endo-
cavitary probes is recommended even if probe covers have been 
used to reduce their contamination since probe covers and low-
level disinfection could fail [4].
HAND SOAP/SANITIZER DISPENSER
Outbreaks of S.  marcescens, New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase 
(NDM)–producing E.  cloacae in neonatal ICUs, or P.  aerugi-
nosa in patients with hematologic malignancy were associated 
with contamination of refillable liquid soap or triclosan soap 
dispensers, facilitating transmission of the pathogen via hands 
of healthcare personnel [76–79]. The use of disposable antisep-
tic with greater bactericidal activity (eg, chlorhexidine) and/
or alcohol-based handrub is recommended, and refilling soap 
dispensers should be avoided [78, 80]. Small-volume dispens-
ers refilled from large-volume stock containers should be con-
sumed until they are entirely empty, rinsed with tap water, and 
then air dried before refilling [81].
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
An outbreak of P. aeruginosa urinary tract infection was reported 
after cystometry; a contaminated pressure dome that covered a 
pressure transducer of urodynamic system was implicated as the 
source [82]. Several Serratia outbreaks also occurred as follows: S. 
marcescens bacteremia in a cardiac care unit via a pressure trans-
ducer of intra-aortic balloon pump, S. marcescens endophthalmi-
tis after cataract surgery via a pressure transducer of the virectomy 
apparatus, and Serratia liquefaciens infection in an ICU via a 
pressure monitoring system [83–85]. Wiping reusable transducer 
heads with 70% sterile isopropyl alcohol between patients or use 
of disposable domes, and careful adherence to aseptic technique, 
should be used to prevent such outbreaks [8, 86, 87].
STETHOSCOPE
Healthcare-associated outbreaks via stethoscope occurred in 
combination with other reservoirs (eg, artificial nails, com-
puter mouse, ointment, sink, other environment) and were 
caused by A. baumannii in an ICU, ESBL-producing K. pneu-
moniae, K. pneumoniae bacteremia in neonatal ICUs, or Verona 
integron-mediated metallo-β-lactamase (VIM)–producing car-
bapenem-resistant P.  aeruginosa in various ICUs, suggesting 
dissemination of an outbreak strain via healthcare personnel 
[88–91]. Stethoscope and other noncritical items should be dis-
infected with an EPA-registered low-level disinfectant between 
patient uses, given the nature and degree of contamination [2, 4].
MISCELLANEOUS
For articles falling into the low clinical significance category 
and contamination, each pathogen and fomite are described in 
Table 2. Contamination of disinfectant atomizers (eg, chlorhex-
idine diluted, didecyl diammonium chloride) was involved in 
outbreaks of Alcaligenes xylosoxidans wound infection in burn 
patients [92] and Achromobacter bacteremia in pediatric patients 
with hematologic malignancy [93], respectively, which high-
lighted the need to use disinfectants appropriately [4, 24]. To pre-
vent microbial contamination of disinfectants and antiseptics, the 
CDC guideline recommends as follows: (1) following the man-
ufacturers’ instruction regarding dilution (if needed); (2) avoid-
ing contamination of disinfectants with water used for dilution, 
containers, and hospital preparation areas; and (3) storing stock 
solutions of disinfections as indicated on the product label [4].
A pseudo-outbreak of extremely drug-resistant P. aeruginosa 
urinary tract infections was caused by contamination of an 
automated urine cytometric analyzer following nonobservances 
of the standard routine sample process [94]. Reused and shared 
measuring cup for catheter drainage also caused a Shewanella 
outbreak in a surgical ward, which highlighted the need of strict 
adherence to standard precautions [95]. For enteric feeding, 
outbreaks of Salmonella enteritidis and S. marcescens were asso-
ciated with contamination of lyophilized enteral nutrition [96] 
and a bottle of enteral feed additive [97], respectively. It is essen-
tial to use sterile commercial feeds, minimize manipulation, 
and use a closed administration set [8]. In addition to outbreaks 
of A. baumannii and S. marcescens infection in neonatal ICUs 
via contaminated breast milk pumps [98, 99], there are addi-
tional outbreaks associated with contamination of breast milk 
(eg, expressed, pooled, or shared breast milk) by a pathogen (eg, 
Bacillus cereus, ESBL-producing Escherichia coli, MRSA, or S. 
marcescens) [100–103].
A VRE outbreak in a burn ICU involved contaminated 
elec-trocardiogram leads, necessitating strict barrier 
precautions in the hydrotherapy area [104], and a S.  
marcescens outbreak in cardiac surgical patients associated 
with electrocardiogram rubber Welsh bulbs required 
replacement of the reusable elec-trocardiogram bulbs with 
disposable leads [105]. Toys have been reported to be 
contaminated with various pathogens [106, 107], and an 
MDR P.  aeruginosa outbreak occurred via water-retaining 
bath toys in a pediatric oncology ward, suggest-ing that use of 
water-retaining toys and other toys that are dif-ficult to clean 
and dry should be limited to a single child [108]. Outbreaks of 
C.  difficile infection in non–isolation rooms or 
Chryseobacterium meningosepticum infection in neonates and 
pediatric patients implicated computer keyboards and other 
medical equipment. Contamination with multiple pathogens 
had been identified on computer keyboards, mobile phones, 
and tablets [109–115]. Razors used for preoperative shaving by 
barbers were implicated in outbreaks of S. marcescens or car-
bapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae postoperative infection 
in neurosurgical patients [116, 117], and shared razors have also 
been associated with tinea corporis due to Microsporum canis 
[118]. Thus, only single-use disposable razors should be used, 
or the razor heads should be disinfected between patient uses. 
Ideally, if hair removal is necessary, an electric shaver with a 
disposable head should be used as it is less damaging to the skin 
(razors should not be used for surgical site preparation). Other 
patient care items as a potential fomite in articles describing 
mainly contamination of pathogens included tourniquet and 
exsanguinator [119, 120], wheelchair [121], and medical record 
[122].
DISCUSSION
Healthcare-associated outbreaks via patient care items com-
monly used in daily practice still occur, but the number of 
articles describing actual infections caused by these health-
care fomites has been limited except for some items. Despite 
the dramatically lower documented risk of transmitting path-
ogens to patients through noncritical items compared to crit-
ical and semicritical items noted in a previous review [123], 
there is a potentially substantial burden of medical equipment 
on healthcare-associated outbreaks as identified in the current 
review. We also found more articles that reported only contam-
ination of medical devices with a pathogen without evidence 
of patient-associated infections, suggesting potential fomites in 
healthcare settings. However, in assessing microbial contamina-
tion with a fomite in different studies, meaningful comparison 
of contamination levels is difficult or impossible since a stand-
ard environmental sampling method of medical equipment is 
not well-established, and permissible levels of microbial con-
tamination are undefined [2, 3, 9]. Moreover, in many articles 
of outbreaks associated with a healthcare fomite, levels of hand 
hygiene and environmental cleaning as well as disinfection were 
not evaluated, complicating the ability to subscribe the infec-
tions directly to the fomite [5].
Our review demonstrated a variety of healthcare-associated 
outbreaks via a patient care item due to bacterial pathogens, 
including gram-negative rods, as well as increasing reports of 
fomite-associated outbreaks due to MDROs (eg, carbapenem-re-
sistant Enterobacteriaceae). A previous review showed that the 
majority of bacterial species isolated from contaminated equip-
ment were flora (eg, coagulase-negative staphylococci) com-
monly identified from normal skin and environment, but the 
minority were gram-negative rods [9]. These pathogens in asso-
ciation with healthcare fomites were transmitted primarily by 
direct contact with contaminated items and other environment, 
via healthcare personnel, or by inhalation of aerosols generated 
from the contaminated water for respiratory equipment. Patient 
populations at risk for outbreaks and infections via a patient 
care item included critically ill patients in adult and neonatal 
ICUs. In our review, the main cause of healthcare-associated 
outbreaks was inappropriate disinfection practice for sharing 
items. Other reviews also noted that medical equipment used 
in noncritical settings rarely had cleaning protocol and may be 
involved in frequent transfer of pathogens compared to critical 
settings, suggesting the need for appropriate cleaning and disin-
fection protocols for patient care items commonly used in daily 
practice [9]. Cleaning must precede high-level disinfection or 
sterilization of any reused patient care items [4, 24]. Thus, assur-
ing disinfectants for noncritical medical equipment in addition 
to improving thoroughness of cleaning and disinfection prac-
tice is imperative in terms of infection prevention. As currently 
available disinfectants have both advantages and disadvantages, 
5 components to help select optimal disinfectants in healthcare 
facilities—including relevant kill claims, appropriate wet-con-
tact and kill times, safety, ease of use, and other factors (eg, user 
training and support by the manufacturer, costs, and stand-
ardization)—have been discussed [124]. Hospitals should not 
reprocess single-use devices; they may use third-party reproces-
sors who comply with the same regulatory requirements of the 
device as when the device was originally manufactured as well 
as all applicable FDA labeling requirements when single-use 
devices are reused [4]. In addition, hospitals should follow the 
latest FDA guidance documents on reprocessing and reuse of 
single-use devices as their reuse remains controversial due to 
economic, medical, ethical, regulatory, and legal issues.
Any patient care items used in healthcare settings can be 
contaminated with a healthcare-associated pathogen and are 
a potential fomite, but outbreaks via these fomites can be pre-
vented or minimized by adhering to current recommendations 
(ie, manufacturers and CDC) for cleaning and disinfection/
sterilization of devices and surfaces [4, 24]. Although the trend 
in healthcare-associated outbreaks via a fomite may be affected 
by reporting bias, sharing lessons learned from outbreaks and 
accumulation of practical evidence would help improve infec-
tion prevention for each fomite. It is important for healthcare 
personnel to recognize the increasing role of patient care items 
as a fomite and adhere to prevention strategies for fomite-as-
sociated outbreaks based on current guidelines and the liter-
ature. Further investigations for healthcare fomites, including 
causation between contamination of a pathogen with a fomite 
and actual healthcare-associated outbreaks, elucidation of 
direct and indirect transmission mechanisms via a fomite using 
advanced molecular typing, establishment of standard envi-
ronmental sampling of medical equipment, and improvement 
of adherence to cleaning and disinfection practice against a 
fomite, are warranted.
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